ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization approach to provide proactive resilient scheduling decisions for multiple networked microgrid central controllers under potential extreme events. Our objective is to minimize both risks of false judgement made by microgrid central controllers and damage done to networked microgrids by extreme events through a proactive resilient scheduling process. A risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization approach is developed to handle risks and uncertainties associated with: (i) extreme events that may occur and contingency issues linked to influential buses; (ii) renewable energy sources power generation; (iii) human reactions when faced with an extreme event; and (iv) status of combined cooling, heat and power units. ''Budget of uncertainty'' and risk-management parameters are utilized together to overcome both overconservative issues of conventional robust optimization and human errors that may occur when making decisions. Extensive simulation results from real-world data sets show that the risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization approach we propose can ensure the resilience of networked microgrids under extreme events.
PARAMETERS

U es Degradation and dispatch cost of ES unit ($/kWh). U ts
Degradation and dispatch cost of TS unit ($/kWh).
U on c
Maintenance cost of CCHP unit ($/kW ).
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E l
The specific amount of energy that can be curtailed (kJ 
Charging and discharging rates of TS unit (kBtu). p l,t
Load curtailment rate (kW ). p PE t Real power exchange schedule of each microgrid before the potential extreme event (kW ). p RT t Real-time real power exchange of each microgrid (kW ). P I ,t Real power injection on the influential bus I (kW ).
P j,t
Real power injection on the non-influential bus j (kW ). Q I ,t Reactive power injection on the influential bus I (kVAR).
Q j,t
Reactive power injection on the non-influential bus j (kVAR).
V j,t , θ j,t
Voltage magnitude and phase angle of bus j. P t j,k , Q t j,k
Real and reactive power delivered on distribution lines between bus j and bus k. δ t Cost of the power exchange mismatch ($). ζ x Maximum allowed confidence level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme events, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods and ice storms, are happening more and more often than ever before because of climate changes all over the world. Moreover, most of these extreme events are a danger to the resilience of power systems, especially distribution systems [1] . Distribution lines, substations, distributed energy resources (DERs), and consumers can be seriously damaged by strong winds and flooding, such as during Superstorm Sandy, Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma. Unlike N − 1 and N −2 contingency issues that have been extensively studied (mainly in the transmission system level), aforementioned extreme events could break down a whole distribution system which requires months to restore [2] .
Resilience issues are receiving more attention due to the significant damage that extreme events inflict on power systems. A review of the resilience of power systems during natural disasters is provided in [3] , where the concepts of hardening, proactive scheduling, emergency response and restoration are perfectly defined, as shown in Fig. 1 . The hardening and restoration aspects have been extensively studied [4] - [9] ; however, there are still several challenges that need to be tackled in the proactive scheduling and emergency response areas [10] . When facing an extreme event, in order to provide proactive operation and emergency response, rather than relying on passive methods, the continuous situational awareness issue needs to be considered. Additionally, ensuring the robustness of the distribution system prior to extreme events requires the system operator to handle a lot of uncertainties, such as: (i) weather uncertainty; (ii) reactions of various microgrid central controllers (MGCCs); (iii) resiliency issues related to critical buses and influential lines; and (iv) generation and load uncertainties. Thus, we mainly focus on proactive scheduling in this paper to address these challenges.
Proactive resilient scheduling problem in the distribution system has attracted exponentially increasing attentions lately due to the aforementioned reasons. Specifically, networked microgrids have been adopted to enhance the resilience of distribution systems, where the proactive scheduling of MGCCs has become more important than ever before. A proactive operation strategy for enhancing resilience of microgrids using energy storage (ES) units is proposed in [11] . In addition, to optimally dispatch the mobile based ES units, a resilient routing and scheduling framework is implemented in [12] . Moreover, critical load resiliency is one of the major features in quantifying the resilience of a power system, especially during the extreme event. Thus, the transient stability, such as limits on frequency deviation and limits on bus voltage magnitude and phase angles are correlated together as constraints to provide resiliency control in [13] . Furthermore, not only the modeling of the resilience problem is important, but also how to handle the uncertainties as aforementioned becomes a priority issue that needs to be tackled.
Several optimization approaches have been adopted to handle uncertainties associated with extreme events. Some prior works [14] , [15] consider a stochastic approach to handle such uncertainties, which requires hard-to-obtain probability distributions and adds a lot of computational burden to the problem-solving process. Since the computation time of proactive operation and emergency response stages is limited, stochastic optimization is not suitable to handle resilient proactive scheduling problems. Additionally, a Markov chain approach is chosen by authors in [16] to make resilient proactive operation decisions when facing extreme events, where failure rates of different extreme events are introduced; however, when and where an extreme event will happen changes rapidly in each time slot. Thus, the adaptiveness of an approach is also very important. Other prior works consider conventional robust optimization to handle uncertainties [17] , but do not consider risks of an extreme event developing beyond the proper ''budget of uncertainty'' that is suitable for the proactive scheduling stage, i.e., infeasible for the emergency response stage as shown in Fig. 1 . Moreover, in order to handel such risks, a risk-limiting approach is introduced in [18] , where joint probability density functions is provided for a MGCC to perform restoration. However, the robustness of the proactive scheduling cannot be guaranteed without cooperating with the robust optimization approach. Therefore, we introduce a risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization (RARO) approach to handle these uncertainties and the risks associate with them.
In this paper, we mainly focus on developing a proactive approach to handle resilience issues of networked microgrids that are interconnected microgrids with multiple feeders, which is more difficult to handle compare to that of serial/parallel microgrids on a single feeder [19] . Moreover, one microgrid within the system of networked microgrids can benefit from other microgrids by facilitating high reliability for critical loads [20] . Specifically, MGCCs determine real and reactive power exchanges and select proper ''budget of uncertainty'' sets prior a potential extreme event. Then, after all uncertainties are revealed, MGCCs dispatch their DERs and exchange real and reactive power in real-time though only if tie-line and grid-connected buses are not influenced by an extreme event to make sure networked microgrids are stable and resilient.
We summarize our contributions in following aspects: 1) We present a comprehensive system model for networked microgrids' proactive resilient scheduling problems under extreme events. 2) We study not only the resilience of electricity in networked microgrids, but also their heating resiliency. 3) A RARO approach is proposed to handle the resilient proactive scheduling problem in networked microgrids. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been employed to handle uncertainties in resilient proactive operation problems previously. 4) Extensive simulation results show the effectiveness of our RARO approach that the system can survive from the beginning till the end of an extreme event. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the system modeling in section II. A RARO problem is formulated in section III. Then the optimization problem is solved by an efficient solution algorithm in section IV. We show simulation results in section V. Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODELING
A. NETWORKED MICROGRIDS
There are multiple interconnected microgrids with DERs, including distributed generation (DG) units and distributed storage (DS) units in a system of networked microgrids, as shown in Fig. 2 . Networked microgrids are located downstream of a distribution substation and are managed by MGCCs. Additionally, the microgrids are connected to each other through tie-lines. Specifically, a microgrid consists of trigeneration/combined cooling, heat and power (CCHP) units, renewable energy sources (RES), thermal storage (TS) units, electrical storage (ES) units, real and reactive power demand, cooling demand and heat demand. Each DER has a local controller (LC). MGCCs and LCs exchange information to achieve resilient and stable operation of networked microgrids.
1) COMBINED COOLING, HEAT AND POWER
CCHP systems not only provide stable real and reactive power to fulfill the power demand but also supply either hot or chilled water to nearby buildings to support the heat and cooling demand through utilizing the waste heat from its power generation process [21] . When facing extreme events, the priority of a MGCC is to ensure the resilience of a microgrid. In order to provide sufficient power, heating and cooling for consumers, all CCHP units must be scheduled to VOLUME 7, 2019 stay on unless damaged and disconnected from a microgrid by an extreme event. Therefore, we have following real and reactive power dynamic constraints:
where Additionally, when CCHP units are still on, the increment and decrement of the real power generation between two consecutive time slots need to follow ramping-up and rampingdown constraints:
where RU c and RD c denote the ramping up/down limits of the CCHP unit c.
2) ELECTRICAL AND THERMAL STORAGES
In our model, energy storage units, such as plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and hot water tanks, can provide elastic power and heat back-up when there is a forecasted extreme event. Based on the forecast of losing CCHP units or RES units, the ES and TS units can be relocated to the influenced buses, providing sufficient back-up of both power and heat for the critical load demand. Thus, we have following storage dynamics and operating constraints for ES/TS units. First, we model the energy balance of ES units as follows:
where E es,t denotes the power stored in an ES unit with initial power E es,0 . We use p + es,t and p − es,t as the rates of charging and discharging for ES unit es, and η + es and η − es as the efficiencies of charging and discharging for ES unit es, respectively. Then, we have the physical limitations on the energy levels of ES units:
where the lower bound E es and upper bound E es are imposed to enhance the lifetime of the ES units. Additionally, we have the physical limitations on the charging/discharging rate of ES units:
where P + es and P − es are the upper bounds of the charging and discharging rates, respectively.
For TS units, we can model their storage dynamic and operating constraints similarly:
where E ts,t denotes the heating energy stored in the TS unit ts. and H − ts are the maximum charging and discharging rates of TS unit ts, respectively. E ts and E ts are the minimum and maximum energy levels of TS unit ts.
3) CRITICAL AND NON-CRITICAL ENERGY DEMAND
In our model, in order to enhance the resilience of networked microgrids, we classify the real power demand as critical and non-critical power demand. For critical power demand, the MGCC must ensure that adequate power generation is provisioned to meet their demand requirements within the operating horizon and cannot be curtailed. Parameter D j,t is introduced as the aggregated critical power demand of the bus j.
For non-critical power demand, they are allowed to be curtailed with a pre-defined reasonable penalty within a certain time interval (usually during the emergency response stage [t 2 , t 3 ]). The specific amount of energy that can be curtailed is modeled as E l , where each non-critical power demand l is allowed to be curtailed within the time interval [T b l , T e l ]. Outside of this time interval, the non-critical power demand becomes ''critical power demand'', which must be satisfied without interruption. For each non-critical load l, the load curtailment rate p l,t should be in the safe operation limitations of [P l , P l ] to prevent a potential cascading failure. The noncritical power demand requirement is expressed as:
Furthermore, as the heat demand is critical during extreme events such as snowstorms, we use H t to represent the aggregated heat demand of all the buses in a system of networked microgrids.
4) LINEARIZED AC POWER FLOW EQUATIONS
In our model, buses, lines and components in the networked microgrids suffer differently when facing extreme events [22] . For example, in one microgrid, the tie-line connected bus i and the point of common coupling (PCC) connected bus 0 is more influential. Besides, the tie-lines connecting various microgrids within the networked microgrids are also more influential than the distribution lines within each microgrid. Specifically, the components connected to the influential buses have higher risks of being damaged or disconnected from the networked microgrids. Thus, we mainly focusing on modeling the unique features related with these influential components. The conventional AC power flow equations are linearized through the following steps extended from [23] : (i) bus 0 and bus i are influential buses in each microgrid (denoted as I buses); (ii) (V j,t − V k,t ) 2 ≈ 0, where V j,t is the voltage magnitude on bus j at time t; (iii) sin(θ j,t − θ k,t ) ≈ θ j,t − θ k,t , and cos(θ j,t − θ k,t ) ≈ 1, where θ j,t denotes the voltage phase angle on bus j at time t; and (iv) the critical power demand are on the less-influential buses. Also, N c j , N l j , N r j and N es j are sets of CCHP, non-critical power demand, RES and ES units that are connected to bus j, respectively. Therefore, the real and reactive power injection equations are formulated as follows:
where P j,t is the real power injection on bus j at time t. Variable p RT t indicates the actual real power exchange between networked microgrids and the main grid, as well as between each microgrid through tie-lines at time t. w r,t denotes the real power generation from the RES unit r at time t.
where Q j,t is the reactive power injection on bus j at time t. Variable q RT t represents the real-time reactive power exchange between networked microgrids and the main grid, as well as between each microgrid through tie-lines at time t.
Similarly, the detailed linearized real and reactive power flow equations are formulated:
where G j,k and B j,k are the real and imagine parts of the Y matrix of the networked microgrid. Variable P t j,k denotes the real power flow from bus j to bus k at time t.
Variable Q t j,k represents the reactive power flow from bus j to bus k at time t.
5) NETWORK CONSTRAINTS
In order to ensure the stability and resilience of networked microgrids, we have the following lower and upper bounds on the voltage magnitude and phase angle:
where V j and V j are the lower and upper bounds on the voltage magnitude at bus j. Parameters θ j and θ j are the lower and upper bounds on the voltage phase angle at bus j. In addition, the resiliency of networked microgrids is also influenced by congestion, where the lower and upper bounds on real and reactive power flows on the distribution lines are listed as follows:
Parameters P j,k and Q j,k are the real and reactive power flow limitations on the distribution lines between bus j and bus k.
6) ENERGY BALANCE
As mentioned above, the heat loads are critical loads, (especially during extreme weather events, such as hurricane/strong wind/snow storm) that can be supplied the combination of CCHP units and TS units. Or when all the CCHP units are damaged or disconnected from the microgrid, the heat demand will be satisfied by the truck-based dispatchable TS unit only. Moreover, the heating (hot water in most cases) is not like the electricity, which can only be delivered within a short distance without decaying that significant [24] . Therefore, we assume that the heating cannot be transferred between microgrids, which can only be dispatched within a microgrid. Unlike heat demand H t , the cooling demand C t is assumed less critical, which is required to be satisfied before the extreme event. The heating and cooling balances are expressed as follows:
where we use power-to-heat ratio α c and power-to-cooling ratio β c to represent the relationship between power and useful heat and the cooling output of CCHP unit c.
B. RISK MANAGEMENT
In our model, uncertainties associated with an extreme event introduce a lot of risks into the networked microgrids. The risks reveal themselves in multiple aspects, as mentioned in previous sections. There are several ways to manage these risks, such as value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional-value-atrisk (CVaR) [25] methods. In our model, we extend the CVaR method to handle risks associated with the resiliency issues in networked microgrids. The reason why we select this method is because we can obtain the proper ''budget of uncertainty'' [26] through managing risks of uncertainties. The trade-off between optimality and conservativeness is handled by the budget of uncertainty, where the decision of selecting the proper budget of uncertainty is made by MGCCs. Thus, the risk of selecting an improper budget of uncertainty must be ensured to be less than a certain confidence level . Therefore, we have the following risk management constraint:
x denotes different kinds of uncertainties, Parameter ζ x denotes the maximum allowed confidence level (usually 5%).
C. TOTAL COST
In each time slot t between proactive scheduling stage t 1 and emergency response stage t 3 , the total cost of the networked microgrids is formulated as follows: 
Note that in equation (25) 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. UNCERTAINTY SET FOR RES GENERATION
As mentioned in previous sections, the robust optimization can handle various uncertainties through a pre-defined deterministic interval, such as [w t −ŵ 
B. UNCERTAINTY SET FOR CRITICAL POWER DEMAND
When facing an extreme event, critical loads in networked microgrids may increase the total demand based on temperature change or other situations. Thus, it is important to consider potential demand changes when a disaster strikes since they cannot be curtailed. Similarly, we used t as the nominal value (i.e., forecasted value) of the critical load demand in period t. Then, the critical load demand d t in time slot t can be expressed as
the maximum negative and positive deviations of the critical load demand in period t, respectively. Similarly, coordinating with the budget of uncertainty d , we have the following cardinality uncertainty set for critical load demand: 
C. UNCERTAINTY SET FOR INFLUENTIAL BUSES
We use an auxiliary variable z t to denote the resiliency issues of the influential buses and lines. When an extreme event happens, the real-time power exchange between networked microgrids and the main grid, as well as between each microgrid through tie-lines, may be different from the pre-event schedule due to damaged distribution lines and tie-lines. Also, we consider that all the tie-lines will be influenced at the same time, which is reasonable for a small distribution system. Similarly, coordinating with the budget of uncertainty I , we have the following cardinality uncertainty set for influential buses and lines: (29) where P t and Q t represent the line capacity of the real and reactive power, respectively.
D. UNCERTAINTY SET FOR CCHP STATUS
As mentioned in previous sections, O c,t 2 is used to denote resiliency issues of each CCHP unit c. When O c,t 2 is 0, the CCHP unit c is disconnected from the networked microgrids, which is influenced by an extreme event at t 2 . When O c,t 2 is 1, the CCHP unit is connected to the networked microgrids, which is not influenced by the extreme event at t 2 . Similarly, coordinating with the budget of uncertainty g , we have the following cardinality uncertainty set for CCHP status:
E. TWO-STAGE ADAPTIVE ROBUST RISK-CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
We construct a two-stage adaptive robust risk-constrained optimization formulation to provide resilient proactive operation decisions for MGCCs. In the first stage, MGCCs make their own decisions regarding the pre-event power exchange schedule using both inter-exchange among microgrids and outer-exchange with the main grid, and select proper budgets of uncertainty to ensure the system can survive through the emergency response stage. Then the MGCCs dispatch each dispatchable unit in networked microgrids to ensure resilience by minimizing the operating cost with that all uncertainties have been revealed in the second stage. The adaptiveness of our approach is from the worst-case scenario that contains all the realizations of the uncertainties. 
subject to constraints (1)- (24).
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
For the simplicity of presenting the solution algorithm, we rewrite the original two-stage risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization formulation into a matrix form:
T y = w,
where (p, h, w, d) is the set of adaptive second-stage decisions based on first-stage decisions p and uncertainty sets z and O. y is the second-stage decisions, including p, h, w, d. Equation (33) represents the constraints related to only firststage variables (1), (28), (30) and (31), where equation (34) collects constraints (4)- (12) and (15)- (23) . Equation (35) accounts for constraints (13) and (26), which involve uncertain RES power generation. Equation (36) accounts for constraints (13) and (27) , which include uncertain critical load demand.
A. PROBLEM REFORMULATION
The formulation above is still a min-max-min problem, which cannot be solved directly by commercial solvers. Thus, as strong duality holds, we transform the inner min problem into its dual as a max problem:
where λ, µ and ϕ denote Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (34), (35) and (36), respectively. However, there are two bilinear terms, µ T w and ϕ T d, in (37), which makes VOLUME 7, 2019 the second-stage problem hard to solve. Thus, we need to linearize the bilinear terms through the Big-M method [27] .
As shown in equations (26) and (37), RES generation is independent from all the other variables. Therefore, the realization of worst-case scenario w * must be the extreme points of W, where we assumeŵ
Then, we can substitute (26) into the bilinear term µ T w as follows:
Similarly, we can express ϕ T d as:
Then, we can transform the original bilinear dual problem into a linear one with the Big-M method [28] :
where σ ± t and π ± t are auxiliary variables. M is a constant number that is large enough.
B. COLUMN-AND-CONSTRAINT GENERATION ALGORITHM
Combined with all the formulations from previous sections, we can finally reformulate the primal problem into the following mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem:
As mentioned in previous sections, the worst-case scenario of each set of uncertainty is independent from all others and can only occur at a set's upper and lower bound, which are finite. Thus, {{w s , O s , z s , d s }, s = 1, 2, . . . , S} are the upper and lower bounds of the joint set W × O × Z × D. To solve the problem in a reasonable solution time, we employ the column-and-constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm [29] . The basic idea of the C&CG algorithm is that a problem formulation with a partial enumeration of possible worstcase scenarios provides a valid relaxation to the original problem (41); we can calculate a lower bound by solving this relaxed problem (master problem). Hence, by adding a non-trivial possible worst-case scenario at each iteration, we can obtain a stronger lower bound. Meanwhile, at each iteration, we can find a corresponding upper bound by solving the second-stage problem (sub problem) with the first stage decisions being fixed. The algorithm terminates when the difference between the UB and the LB is within a small tolerance value. Thus, we have the detailed C&CG algorithm as follows:
1) Set p 0 as the feasible first-stage decision with budget of uncertainty I and g . Then, solve the sub problem (40) with the initial conditions. After that, use the answer of w 1 and d 1 as the worst-case scenario. Let UB = +∞ be the upper bound, LB = −∞ be the lower bound, and 1 be the iteration number. 2) Solve the master problem (41) with the worst-case scenario. Determine the updated optimal first-stage decision and budget of uncertainty.
3) Solve the sub problem (40) with the updated optimal solutions from Step 2. Make UB = min{UB,
where ρ * is the updated value of the objective function. 4) If UB − LB ≤ ε, then stop. Otherwise, update s to s + 1 and return to Step 2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first evaluate our two-stage RARO approach in three steps: (i) we obtain the first-stage decisions p PE t and q PE t and choose proper budgets of uncertainty, while testing the convergence rate of the proposed solution algorithm; (ii) we solve the second-stage problem repeatedly for each firststage decision with 1,000 randomly generated scenarios to show the adaptiveness of our proposed approach when facing extreme events; and (iii) we compare the capabilities of our approach with those of both the conventional robust approach and a deterministic approach to handling uncertainties. Then, we test the networked microgrids' resilience under extreme conditions, especially when the extreme event develops to the emergency response stage between t 2 and t 3 . The proposed solution algorithm for the two-stage RARO model is implemented in Python 2.7. The reformulated MILP is solved with GUROBI 8.0.0 on a desktop with an Intel Core i7-7700 4.2 GHz CPU and 16GB of memory. We set 10 −2 as the convergence tolerance.
A. NETWORKED MICROGRIDS
We consider two different microgrids in the set of networked microgrids, which are operated by the same MGCC. The networked microgrids are tested in a system with a modified IEEE 13-bus test feeder and a modified IEEE 34-bus test feeder [30] , as shown in Fig. 3 , where transformers, switches and voltage regulators are removed and the system is assumed to be balanced. The parameters of CCHP units are from [31] . The historical wind power generation data is from [32] . PEVs and hot water tanks are dispatched to the influential buses as forecasted that may be affected by the extreme event, where those parameters are as from [33] . The parameters of critical power loads are from [34] , where non-critical power loads are 10% of the critical power loads. The begin and end time of the non-critical load curtailment time interval are t 1 and t 2 , respectively. The load shedding cost is set to 1000$/kWh. The parameters of heat and cooling demand are from [35] . The pre-event and real-time power exchange prices are from [36] , with proper scaling coefficients. The total time between t 1 and t 3 is set to six hours, where the proactive scheduling stage t 1 to t 2 takes four hours and the emergency response stage takes two hours, respectively. Each hour has four time slots t.
B. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1) C&CG ALGORITHM CONVERGENCE
We test the convergence property of the C&CG decomposition methodology for different budgets of uncertainty:
, g and obtain the optimal first-stage decisions. For the simplicity of demonstration, we show the simulation result of g for the convergence performance.
The UB and LB of the proposed approach with different budgets of uncertainty allotted for the CCHP status are shown in Fig. 4 , where the convergence rate is three iterations. The iteration numbers for other uncertainty sets are from three to six. Therefore, the proposed C&CG algorithm can guarantee its convergence.
2) BUDGET OF UNCERTAINTY AND SYSTEM RESILIENCY
We test the proposed approach's ability to handle various uncertainties given an extreme event, based on several sets of randomly generated scenarios. The aim of this case study is to check the resiliency of the networked microgrids. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated in two aspects: the average total cost and its standard deviation. The average total cost refers to the resiliency of the first-stage decisions and the guessing of the budget of uncertainties; its standard deviation indicates the adaptiveness of the proposed approach based on the first-stage decisions and the sets of budgets of uncertainty.
Firstly, we show the simulation results of the networked microgrids system that is influenced by the normally distributed wind power generation. One set of 1,000 normally distributed scenarios is generated, where the feasible region is from zero to w max with meanw t and standard deviationw t /3. Fig. 5 shows the average total cost for the networked microgrids for each w . We observe that when w is 1, the average total cost is the lowest, which is because the proposed approach dispatches resources in the second stage, based on the wind power generation uncertainty set. As the wind power operating cost is zero, with more available wind power generation, the networked microgrids can reduce costs resulting from enabling expensive emergency options. In addition, we also compare the standard deviation of the total cost for each w , as shown in Fig. 5 , which reduces rapidly when w is small and becomes steady with the increase of w . The reason is that a penalty occurs whenever there is a violation in the energy balance. The MGCC has to curtail the non-critical load to maintain system resiliency when the actual wind power generation is outside of the uncertainty set. Therefore, after considering all these aspects, the proper budget of uncertainty of wind power generation w is set to 2 in our test case.
Secondly, we focus on the CCHP status when an extreme event occurs, where other budget of uncertainty sets are remaining the same as the first settings. One set of 1,000 Bernoulli distribution scenarios is generated, where success probability p is set as 0.9. Fig. 6 shows the average total cost and standard deviation for the networked microgrids for each g . Based on the robustness evaluation criterions mentioned above, we set g to 4 for the proper budget of uncertainty of the CCHP connection status.
Thirdly, we focus on the tie-line connection status when an extreme event occurs, where other budget of uncertainty sets are remaining the same as the first settings. One set of 1,000 Bernoulli distribution scenarios is generated, where success probability p is set as 0.95. Fig. 6 shows the average total cost and standard deviation for the networked microgrids for each I . Similarly, based on the robustness evaluation criteria mentioned above, we set I to 3 for the proper budget of uncertainty of the tie-line connection status. In the randomly generated 1,000 scenarios, the statuses of the tie-line are various in the 8 time slots between t 2 and t 3 . In the worstcase scenarios, the tie-line between the two inter-connected microgrids are damaged, as well as the tie-lines connecting to the main grid through PCC 1 and PCC 2 from the beginning of the t 2 . However, in most of the scenarios, the tie-lines will not be influenced from the beginning of the extreme event, (varies between [t 2 , t 3 ]) which reflects in the Fig. 6 . As shown in Fig. 6 , based on both the average value and its standard deviation, we can see that I set to be 3 is the best choice to balance the cost and survivability of the networked microgrids. This is because the influence of the extreme event usually accelerates with the time, after 2-3 time slots (30-45 mins), the accelerated damage would break down the tie-lines as handled by the budget of uncertainty.
3) THE PROPOSED RARO APPROACH VERSUS PRIOR APPROACHES
We compare our RARO approach with prior approaches to show the capability of the proposed approach in handling uncertainties. In this comparison, we only consider the impact of uncertain wind power generation in networked microgrids.
We first compare the proposed approach with a deterministic approach with the uncertainty set defined above. w = 0 is the case for the deterministic approach, considering zero uncertainty and risk. For the proposed approach, we suggest w = 2, considering both the uncertainty and the risk. As shown in Fig. 5 , both the average total cost and the standard deviation of the total cost of the proposed approach are lower than that of the deterministic approach. This is reasonable since the proposed approach benefits from the first-stage decisions, making it adaptive to the realization of uncertain wind power generation.
Secondly, we compare the proposed approach with a conventional robust approach using the same settings. For the conventional robust approach, w = 1 is the optimal choice. However, compared with the proper budget of uncertainty w = 2 of our approach, the total load curtailment amount of the conventional robust approach, 194.23 kW , is much higher than that of our approach, 0 kW . The reason is that an extreme event can develop in the emergency response stage between t 2 to t 3 , where a plan of w = 1 is not resilient enough to handle the situation. Therefore, with the help of risk management, the proposed RARO approach can ensure the survivability of the networked microgrids system.
4) NETWORKED MICROGRIDS VERSUS INDEPENDENT MICROGRIDS
Furthermore, the performance of a networked microgrids system and two independent microgrids under an extreme weather event is evaluated. In this case, we assume that the tie-line within the networked microgrids survived during the extreme weather event and the tie-lines connected to the main grid are down. Compared with the performance tested for the uncertainty related with the on/off status of CCHP units in Fig. 6 and the uncertainty related with the random output from RES units in Fig. 5 for networked microgrids, the performance of two independent microgrids under the two aforementioned uncertainties is shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 . Only the performance during the extreme event is shown for the two independent microgrids with normal distributed wind power generation in Fig. 9 . This is because we mainly focus on the resiliency issues. As presented in the comparison, for both the average operating costs and the standard deviations of the two uncertainties, the networked microgrids are lower than that of the independent microgrids. This is reasonable since the real and reactive power that are exchanged through the tieline can be utilized by the central controller of the networked microgrids to enhance the resilience of the system, where the two independent microgrids have to rely on their own components, especially when one CCHP unit is damaged in each microgrid by the extreme event.
As shown in Figs. 10, 11, 12 and 13, the two CCHP units are down from the beginning of the extreme event at time t 2 , which influence the voltage magnitude of all the buses in both the 13-bus microgrid and the 34-bus microgrid. However, for the networked microgrids, the real and reactive power exchange through the tie-lie as shown in Fig. 14 help the central controller maintain the voltage magnitude within the predefined safety range of [0.9-1.1] (in per unit value). Moreover, the voltage magnitude of each bus is also maintained within the safety range for the independent microgrids, the reason is that based on the proposed RARO approach, where ES and TS units are dispatched to the influential buses to provide the back-up power and heating supply, the resilience of the independent microgrids can still be ensured. Even though the voltage magnitude of the two systems are all within the safety range, the voltage magnitude of the 13-bus microgrid varies a lot as shown in Fig. 12 , which is worse than that of the 13-bus microgrid in the networked microgrids. It is because the tie-line can not only transfer real-power, but also exchange reactive power between the two microgrids, which contributes a lot in maintaining the voltage magnitude on each bus in the networked microgrids.
5) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this part, we check the effectiveness and resilience of our system model by changing the parameters to simulate an extreme event; in particular, we change the load curtailment time interval in two scenarios. In scenario one, the ES and TS units are in networked microgrids that are pre-scheduled to provide power and heat at the forecasted influenced buses. In scenario two, the ES and TS units are not in the networked microgrids. The impacts of the ES and TS units on the networked microgrids' resiliency are shown in Fig. 15 . The average total cost of scenario one is lower, where ES and TS units are coordinated by MGCCs to maintain the resiliency of the networked microgrids, while the only and expensive choice of scenario two is to perform load shedding. Additionally, with the increase of the load curtailment time interval, the networked microgrids' average total cost decreases. This is because with a longer allowed load curtailment time interval, a non-critical load can provide more flexibility when the TS and ES units are not on the influenced bus.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization approach to provide proactive resilient scheduling decisions for networked microgrids central controllers under potential extreme events. Our objective is to ensure that after proactive resilient scheduling, most of the critical energy demand in the areas at risk of being influenced by the extreme event can still be satisfied by distributed generation units. A risk-constrained adaptive robust optimization approach has been developed to handle the risks and uncertainties associate with an extreme event. Extensive simulation results show that the approach we proposed can ensure the resilience of networked microgrids throughout an extreme event.
There are still challenges that remain in the emergency response stage, such as the issues of situation awareness, dispatching a rescue team, and relay protection. We will continue our study on the highly correlated uncertainties associate with the extreme events in the future research. We will develop a novel method with the vine copula approach to describe the dependence between various uncertainties and reduce the total dimension of the resilience related problems.
